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Key Point Interpreter's fees are recoverable under SIIIA Santiago v MIB [2023] EWCA Civ 838 Here the Court of Appeal grappled with the problem that interpreter's fees were, prima facie, not recoverable as a disbursement in a case to which SIIIA fixed costs applied. Following Cham v Aldred, it was generally accepted that a disbursement could only be recoverable if it arose because of a particular feature of the dispute. In Cham, the disbursement there arose because of a particular feature of the Claimant, namely that they were a child, and thus needed an opinion on quantum before any settlement could be approved. CPR 45.19(2)(e) stipulated that any disbursement not specified could only be recoverable it is arose because of a particular feature of the dispute. As the disbursement arose because of a particular feature of the Claimant, it was not recoverable. The same would therefore apply to interpreter's fees. However, since Cham had been decided, the Civil Justice Council published a report called 'Vulnerable Witnesses and Parties within the Civil Proceedings/ Current position and Recommendations for Change.' This report was addressing the critical need to ensure fair access to justice, and noted the need for interpreters, and that being unable to understand the proceedings made a person vulnerable, in that they could not participate nor give their best evidence. The court had regard to CPR 1.2(b) which required the court to give effect to the overriding objective when interpreting any rule, to ensure parties are on an equal footing and that the case is dealt with fairly. At [62] the court held: the use of the word “other” in sub-paragraph (h) supports the broader interpretation because it implies that the travel expenses and loss of earnings incurred by a party and allowed under sub-paragraphs (f) and (g) are disbursements that are “due to a particular feature of the dispute.” The common feature of such costs is that they facilitate the attendance of a party or witness and thus put the parties on an equal footing by enabling the party or witness to participate fully in the hearing. That is also a defining feature of the cost of an interpreter, without whom the party or witness cannot participate fully in the hearing and, specifically, cannot give their best evidence. Allowing the interpreter’s fee to be recovered under subparagraph (h) is therefore consistent with the inclusion of the disbursements allowed under sub-paragraphs (f) and (g). I would therefore hold that the application of normal principles of construction does not preclude the interpretation of sub-paragraph (h) for which Mr Williams contends. Far from it: in my judgment, the application of normal principles strongly supports his proposed interpretation. I would have reached this conclusion before the 2021 Amendments. At [59] the court noted that in Cham, the disbursement was only incurred after parties had settled, so had no impact on reaching the settlement concerned, whereas without an interpreter, a Claimant who did not speak English could not even get their claim off the ground. The court also noted that the cost of counsel's advice was deemded to be included in the costs allowed in Table 6B, whereas if an interpreter's fee was not recoverable as a disbursement, it was not remunerated at all, either actually or notionally. Therefore the Court of Appeal held that the cost of translator fees were recoverable. At [64] they concluded: "This distinction permits us to conclude that we are not bound by Cham to adopt an interpretation of sub-paragraph (h) which is not in accordance with the overriding objective on the different facts that are in play in the present appeal. I would accept that the effect of Cham is that a disbursement should ordinarily be held to be “reasonably incurred due to a particular feature of the dispute” within sub-paragraph (h) if it was required to enable the determination by the Court of a particular issue in the case rather than because of a particular characteristic of a party or witness. However, where considerations of access to justice arise, a broader interpretation is necessary to enable the dispute to be determined by the Court in accordance with the overriding objective. It follows, in my judgment, that the independent interpreter’s fee (assuming it to be reasonably incurred) is properly to be regarded as a disbursement falling within sub-paragraph (h)." Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Key Point A Court can restrict to Portal costs under CPR 44 generally following a Portal breach, not just under CPR 45.24(2) Williams v Secretary of State for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy [2018] EWCA Civ 852 Here the court considered a case where CPR 45.24 was not available as Part 7 proceedings had not been issued. The court found that they could reach the same result via a different route, namely by the use of CPR 44.11. Court of Appeal noted it was hardly unusual for the CPRs to provide for two concurrent routes to the same result. This is exactly as the SCCO found in Davies v Greenway and Tunbridge Wells CC found on appeal in Brown v Ezeugwa . Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Key Point The special rules on Soft Tissue Injury Claims do not apply once a subsequent report takes the claim out of being a soft tissue injury claim, irrespective of when the reports were disclosed Moesaid v Calder DDJ Kube, Manchester CC, 27th August 2021 The Claimant disclosed a GP report, then started Stage 2 of the MOJ Portal and disclosed both reports with the Stage 2 pack. Damages were settled without a hearing. D argued that para 7.8A of the RTA Portal Protocol required the Claimant to disclose the first report before obtaining the second report. C argued that the rules only required that the first report be disclosed before the second report is disclosed. In any event, C argued that the claim was not a soft tissue injury claim so the special rules in RTA Protocol cases did not apply to this claim. D argued that the case only ceased to be a soft tissue injury claim on the receipt of the second report, and thus if the second report was inadmissible because it had not been disclosed in accordance with the rules then the claim remained a soft tissue injury claim. The court found that this was a soft tissue injury claim and therefore the special rules in 7.8A did not apply to this claim. It therefore did not need to go on and decide if the second report had been disclosed in accordance with the rules. Instructed by Steven Sherlock, Bespoke Costs Ltd Click here for judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Sarah Robson Barrister Fixed Costs Specialist Call now on 0800 634 9650 Legal Articles* * This website is intended to provide general guidance only. It does not give legal or professional and is not to be used in providing the same. Whilst all efforts have been made to ensure that the information is accurate, any liability including that arising in is excluded to the fullest extent lawfully permitted for any loss or damage howsoever arising from the use of this information. Precedent U.xlsx Precedent U The new Precedent U has just been released for assessement of fixed costs under the new regime. Download it here. SCCO Guide 2023 The latest SCCO guide is now out. Click here for a copy. Premature Issue Article on the case of Bobby Prior v Silverline International Ltd, HHJ Wood QC, Liverpool CC, 8th July 2015 now available. Claimant issue proceedings after 21 days in accordance with the letter of the personal injury pre-action protocol. However, there was no compliance with the spirit of the protocol. The Claimant was reduced to pre-issue costs by the Designated Circuit Judge of Liverpool. Click here for article including copy of the judgment. Legal Humour A light-heartedly look at the law and legal profession. (Submissions for inclusion here gratefully received.) A poor solicitor can cause a trial to be delayed for months. A good solicitor can cause a trial to be delayed for years. Caveat : No lawyers were harmed during the construction of this site. When a person assists a criminal they are aiding and abetting. When a person assists a criminal we call them a defence lawyer. The pupil barrister carefully warned his client not to lie when giving evidence. He asked if his client appreciated what could happen if he did not tell the truth in court. "We'll probably win" his client replied. Why did the lawyer cross the road? To sue the chicken. What's the difference between a good lawyer and a great lawyer? A good lawyer knows the law, a great lawyer knows the judge. Never mind the dog - Beware of the dog's lawyer. When does a claim start? Sarah has again successfully argued a claim does not start for the purposes of Part 7 until the court issues the claim. A claim which settles before the court has issued it only attracts predictive costs, per CPR 7.2, PD 7A 5.1 and CPR 44.12A (c), even if the papers have been sent to the court. Provisional Assessment Oral Review In order to recover the costs of an oral review of a Provisional assessment, CPR 47.15(10) requires the applicant to obtain an adjustment in its own favour by 20% or more of the sum provisionally assessed. Is that just the items reviewed or 20% of the whole bill? This issue was considered by Master O'Hare in Keah M B O'Reilly v H R Richmond Ltd, SCCO, 16.09.14. The court confirmed it was 20% of the whole bill, not just the part(s) being reviewed. The court was also invited to use its discretion under CPR 47.15(1)(b) because of the adjustment of more than 20% achieved on the items reviewed, but declined to do so. Click here for an approved note of the judgment. What is the nature of a Provisional Assessment Oral Review? This new procedure has little guidance as to what is and is not allowed. Is an Oral Review just a review, a rehearing, or is it more like an appeal where parties are limited to what they raised in the Provisional Assessment hearing? Cook on Costs has one line stating the court will hear issues 'afresh'. Dr Mark Friston confirms the same view in Friston on Costs 3rd Edition. Other than that, there appears to be no guidance at all. HHJ Wood QC, the DCJ at Liverpool has considered this on appeal twice and has concluded that new evidence can be admitted on oral review. Download copies of the judgments here in the cases of: Ion v Ahmed , and Mehmi v Pincher . NB a more recent version is available above, this is just for reference SCCO Guide 2018 SCCO Guide 2018 The first guide published by the SCCO since 2013 is available. Click here to download a free copy of this important procedural guide . Miscellaneous Expenses A lot of fuss and bother over nothing? Ghattaorya v Bailey LTLPI 05/10/2009 My case of Ghattaorya v Bailey on miscellaneous expenses is several years old, yet it still attracts vast numbers of hits on my site. One cannot its importance when Part 36 offers are close, and thousands of pounds in costs can turn on whether this is allowed or disallowed. Do not ignore miscellaneous expenses! Claimant solicitors plead ‘miscellaneous’ expenses as an almost mandatory ‘add-on.’ This is to cover the cost of subsidiary expenses which have been incurred because of the litigation. Whilst it is that you cannot recover stress and anguish incurred because of litigation, the miscellaneous claim seems to have slipped through the net as a legitimate expense. This head of deserves closer inspection: The miscellaneous claim is for telephone calls, postage and stationary - travel is usually claimed for separately. Miscellaneous claims in your average fast track case typically range from about £10 to £50. There may have been the cost of posting an initial form reporting the incident to the insurer or solicitor, perhaps with a covering letter. However, many insurance companies take a claim over the phone now, rather than requiring the completion of a form, or provide a pre-paid envelope. The postage, therefore, is probably no more than one or two stamps, so less than say, £1. The cost of stationery – a single sheet of writing if any, well with a ream costing around the £3 mark for 500 sheets that’s not even a penny. Many insurance companies and solicitors firms provide free-phone numbers or call numbers, e.g. 0845. Some solicitors firms now encourage all correspondence with the lay client to be by email. BT charge mere pennies per minute for geographic calls from a landline, and if the claimant is on an all-inclusive package then there is no extra cost to them. All-inclusive phone packages are more common now, and the chances are more claimants will be on some form of ‘TV/Telephone/Broadband’ package. Put the claimant to proof and a judge will laugh at you, as there are hardly ever any receipts for these sorts of expenses. Cross-examine, and you risk the wrath of the judge and a stop being placed on cross-examination thus deemed ‘unnecessary’. Most sensible Counsel (with sensible instructions) will get their heads together before trial and some compromise figure. However, if you must press ahead and attack the claim in court, zip in with a pin-point question. The most devastating attack, however, is simply to ask the judge to compare the length of time claimed on the cost schedule for telephone attendances on the claimant, with the cost at even 5.25p/min for even every single call. The miscellaneous claim is then often dealt a hefty blow by the judge’s pen. In this case, the judge dismissed the entire head of claim for miscellaneous expenses, noting that claiming for miscellaneous expenses was ‘a bad habit claimant solicitors had got into’. That principle was approved by HHJ Harrington in Harwood v Kapek (2010) LTLPI 21/7/2010 citing the failure to correctly plead the losses under this head as the reason for not allowing a miscellaneous claim, Ghattaorya v Bailey approved. There are a few (easier to spell) other cases on miscellaneous expenses, but Ghattaorya v Bailey is the most well known and often referred to. Click here for a copy of the judgment.

Key Point Recoverability of disbursements in SIIIA cases Cham (by their Litigation Friend Laura Martin) v Aldred [2019] EWCA Civ 1780 The SIIIA fixed costs regime provides for an advice from counsel in infant cases in the sum of £150. This seemingly untroubling disbursement was awarded at first instance and first tier appeal. However, the Defendant appealed again, and argued it was not recoverable in addition to fixed profit costs. The matter came before LJs Coulson, McCombe and Davies on 8th October, and judgment was handed down on 25th October 2019. LJ Coulson gave the lead judgment and found that the infant approval advice was required not because of a particular feature of the dispute, but because of a particular feature of the Claimant, namely that they were an infant. Therefore it was not recoverable. The court also considered the potential for overlap, claiming the same disbursement under the ‘catch all’ provision in CPR 45.29I(2)(h). At [51] the court held that if an item was specifically within Table 6B, it would not be recoverable in addition to fixed costs. The brief fee was the most obvious example. The court also churned out the oft repeated ‘swings and roundabouts’ argument mentioned in Sharp v Leeds City Council [2017] EWCA Civ 33 . Thus, the appeal was allowed. Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Key Point Cannot argue 'would have left the Portal anyway' Raja v Day & MIB HHJ Gregory, Liverpool CC, 2nd March 2015 The Claimant had some difficulty in locating the correct and sent CNFs to a number of incorrect Defendants before finding the correct one. However, instead of sending them a CNF first, the Claimant issued Part 7 proceedings against them. At first instance, the lower court found that the claim would have left the Portal anyway, and declined to restrict the Claimant to Portal costs. However, on appeal, the court found the Claimant had acted unreasonably. The court also held that the lower court had been wrong to find that the claim would have left the Portal anyway. The Claimant was restricted to Portal costs. This case, along with Tennant v Cottrell , Dawrant v Part & Parcel Network and Hussain v Wardle confirms that a court cannot use hindsight when assessing whether a Claimant has acted unreasonably in breaching the Portal. A court must look at things as they were at the time of the breach. There can be no retrospective justification for an earlier Portal breach. Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Key Point Portal offers remain open for acceptance until withdrawn, even after Part 7 proceedings have been issued Akinrodoye v Esure DJ Goodchild, Romford CC, 16th Feb 2015 This claim had started in the MOJ RTA Portal and Part 7 proceedings were issued. Later the Defendant sought to accept the Claimant's Portal offer, but the Claimant argued that their offer was no longer available for acceptance because Part 7 proceedings had been issued (trying to distinguish this from Purcell v McGarry .) However, the court found that a Portal offer remains open for acceptance unless withdrawn and that it could not be implicitly withdrawn nor withdrawn automatically because certain events such as proceedings had been issued. This is an important case as it extends the decision in Purcell to make it clear that Portal offers remain open for acceptance unless and until withdrawn. Litigants need to be careful to ensure that they have not left any unsuitable Portal offers open if circumstances have changed. Click here for a copy of the judgment Go back to Main Index Main Index Go back to Topic Index Topic Index

Miscellaneous cases Offer of Zero is a Valid Offer Dickinson v Langford Birkenhead CC, 14th Feb 2013 Piotr Glazer v Nathan Reid DDJ Johnson, Liverpool CC, 2nd Mar 2012 Range of Prognosis Period given Dominic v Martin HHJ Stewart QC, Manchester CC, 21st Jul 2011 (First Portal appeal, established that should award in middle where range of prognosis given in absence of witness evidenc e) Interim Payments Luvin v Ageas Insurance Ltd DJ Doyle, Birkenhead CC, 17th Sept 2015 (Sets out the rules and procedure on interim payments) Ampratwum v Zbigniew Samajeden & Esure Birkenhead CC, 5th Jun 2013 (special rules on interim payments for vehicle related damages - judgment not available) Montreal Convention Claims Mead v British Airways PLC DJ Moss, Manchester County Court, 15th Jan 2018 (The Portal does not apply to Montreal Convention Claims) McKendry v Br itish Airways PLC DJ Baldwin (sitting as Regional Costs Judge) Liverpool County Court, 16th May 2018 (The Portal does not apply to Montreal Convention Claims) Go Back to Index Click on the button below to go back to the case law index Index

Cannot use Hindsight or Speculation Raja v Day & MIB HHJ Gregory, Liverpool CC, 2nd Mar 2015 (Cannot take into account would have left the Portal anyway) Tennant v Cottrell DJ Jenkinson, Liverpool CC, 11th Dec 2014 (Cannot change reason for leaving, nor retrospectively justify reason) Dawrant v Part & Parcel Network Ltd HHJ Parker, Liverpool CC, 28th April 2016 Sitting with Regional Costs Judge Jenkinson, as Assessor (First Tier Appeal - Cannot use hindsight when a case has left the Portal) Ryan v Hackett [2020] EWHC 288 (QB) (Could take into account what happens after a claim leaves the Portal when determining costs on the facts of this case) Go Back to Index Click on the button below to go back to the case law index Index